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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM K. HOWARD, RUTH N. 
HOWARD, ROBERT D. HOWARD, 
and SHIRLEY L. HOWARD, 
Plaintiffs and Responden_~s, 
MILDRED M. H;~ ARD, f 
Defendant and Appellant, 
MILDRED M. HOWARD, 
Defendant and Third Party 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
WALKER BANK & TRUST COM-
pANY, as Administrator of the estate 
of L. W. HOvV ARD, deceased, WIL-
LIA1YI K. HOWARD, RUTH N. HO-
WARD, ROBERT D. HOWARD and 
SHIRLEY L. HOWARD, 
Th.ird Party Defendants, 
and Respondents, 
Case 
No. 9552 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
Appeal from Third District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, 
Hon. A. H. Ellett, Presiding Judge 
PERRIS S. JENSEN, 
Attorney for Respondents 
Walker Bank Bldg., 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
BACKMAN, BACKMAN & 
CLARK, 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant, 
1111 Deseret Bldg., 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM K. HOWARD, RUTH N. 
HOWARD, ROBERT D. HOWARD, 
and SHIRLEY L. HOWARD, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
1\fiLDRED M. HOWARD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MILDRED M. HOWARD, 
Defendant and Third-Party 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
WALKER BANK & TRUST COM-
pANY, as Administrator of the estate 
of L. "\V. HOWARD, deceased, WIL-
LIAM l(. HOWARD, RUTH N. 
HOWARD, ROBERT D. HOWARD 
and SHIRLEY L. HOWARD, 
Third-Party Defendants, 
and Respondents. 
Case No. 
9552 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
Respondents agree with appellant's statement of 
fact in which appellant states the single question is 
whether that deed dated :3lay 9th, 1945 which the trial 
court held to be defective, contained such description 
that the land might be identified which was intended to 
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be conveyed and therefore did convey the property, and 
whether the trial court errored in denying appellant's 
motion to assign the case for trial and to permit appel-
lant to amend her cross-complaint. Respondents how-
ever, inject into their brief and argue matters not con-
sidered by the lower court and which could not have 
been considered by the lower court without the taking of 
testimony; namely as respondents contend, (1) lack of 
delivery of the de-ed, and (2) the inequities which would 
be brought about ·were the deed to be reformed. We 
contend the argument of these points at this time is 
most unfair to appellant and improper. This is repe-
titious of the tactics used by respondents in the lower 
court and which we think influenced the decision in this 
case. 
The judgment entered and from which this appeal is 
taken, recites that the deed is void for uncertainty. There 
is no mention therein of lack of delivery or of the ques-
tion of equities. Therefore we shall dwell but little in 
answer to this part of respondents' brief. 
Had appellant been afforded the opportunity to 
produce evidence in the case the evidence would show 
that respondents had, during the lifetime of their father, 
received monies and properties to such extent that the 
equities would weigh more favorably to appellant than 
to respondents. Respondents 'vill probably take the 
position that their arguing the question of lack of delivery 
and equities is to ~ho'v lack of intent on the part of the 
grantor, but respondents have gone far beyond such 
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showing and they have included in their argument, state-
Inents "·hich are not before the court in the pleadings or 
othenvise as to the amount and value of property covered 
by the deed, and values of other properties which they 
state "·pr0 received by appellant from her husband. 
Respondents "rould have the court believe appellant was 
a wife 'vho 1narried the deceased grantor late in life for 
one purpose only, to acquire the property and estate of 
the deceased as against the children of deceased by a 
fonner marriage, but the pleadings do not support such 
contention. On the contrary, it is sho"\\t"'Il by the pleadings 
that appellant bore children by deceased, that one son 
of decedent and appellant was at the time of the death 
of the decedent, seventeen years of age. 'Therefore, it is 
evident from the record of the case that decedent and 
appellant were living together as husband and wife for 
in excess of seventeen years, and they were living to-
gether as husband and wife at the time of the death of 
decedent. It is clearly evident from such record that the 
grantor did not intend to make a defective deed as 
respondents contend. Where do respondents find one 
\Vord in this record indicating even remotely that appel-
lant made life so miserable for decedent that in order 
to have a little peace at home decedent led his \vife to 
believe he was deeding property to her when in fact he 
\Vas intentionally making a defective deed? 
As to respondents argument under their point 2 that 
the deed \vas not intended as a present conveyance of a 
present interest because appellant stated she was in-
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structed to place the deed of record upon the death of 
the grantor. If the question were properly before the 
court, which we contend it is not and could not be with-
out the taking of evidence, this court has held in the 
Losee case 120 U. 385, 235 P. 2d 132, cited in appellant's 
original brief, and in many other cases, that the delivery 
of the deed is the detenninative act and not the record-
ing of same. This court held in the Lose·e case, where 
the grantor made deeds to children and delivered them 
to one of her daughters with instructions to deliver 
them to grantees after grantor's death, grantor even 
having access to the deeds, and the daughter to whom 
the deeds were delivered testifying she would have given 
the deeds back had the grantor changed her mind, con-
stituted a valid delivery passing title. Here appellant 
alleged in her cross complaint that decedent made, exe-
cuted and delivered to her the deed describing the prop-
erty herein, and the lower court was obliged for the 
purpose of the motion for judgment on the pleadings 
to assume those allegations as true. 
Respondents cite and rely on the case of Stanley vs. 
Stanley, 94 P. 2d 465, 97 U. 250. It is interesting to 
note in the Stanley case the court refers to the case of 
Mower vs. Mower, 64 U. 260, 228 P. 911 and at page 
467 quotes as follows: 
''Since delivery is essentially a matter of 
intent, which intent is to be arrived at from all 
the facts and surrounding circumstances, we be-
lieve the better rule is to include in those facts 
and eircun1stances declarations of the grantor 
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both before and after the date of the deed, at 
least where it appears that the dec]arations are 
made fairly and in the ordinary course of life." 
'11he court will we think, follow the better rule as 
announced in the JJf ower case and determine the case 
from the facts and surrounding circumstances put into 
evidence, not from bald statements which are not evi-
dence. 
As to error on the part of the lower court in not 
affording appellant the opportunity to produce evidence 
in the case we again refer to the Stanley case, page 467 
wherein the court said: 
"With respect to the delivery of the deed, 
the trial court excluded evidence offered by the 
defendant as to the formal act of delivery as being 
incompetent under the provisions of Sec. 104-49-2, 
R.S.U. 1933. However, she was permitted to tes-
tify that she first saw the deed on May 19, 1906, 
in the testator's hands and next saw it in her own 
hands after which she immediately placed it in 
a tin box; that when she first saw the deed the 
testator was removing it from his pocket, remark-
ing that he had a present for her, and handed 
it to her, and that she paid him a dollar, request-
ing however, that the deed be not recorded until 
after his death, and that thereafter it remained 
in her possession." 
"This testimony would undoubtedly justify 
an inference that the deed was delivered and 
should be considered prima facie sufficient for 
that purpose." 
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While the law above quoted from the Stanley case 
is applicable to the· ins~~nt case we find the reason the 
court found the deed· had not been delivered with intent 
to presently pass title 'vas that the evidence showed the 
grantee filed a will upon the death of the grantor of. the 
deed, which will named the grantee as beneficiary. In 
the petition for probate of the will the grantee who was 
the petitioner alleged in a verified petition that the tes-
tator owned the property in question at the time of his 
death. A second and later will was found giving the 
property described in the deed to an adopted son who 
filed a petition for probate of the later will. Thereupon 
the grantee filed· ·the deed of record and claimed _title 
by virtue of the deed. The facts as pleaded in the instant 
case are not even remotely like those of the Stanley case. 
Under point 3 respondents cite Page on Wills. We 
have no argument with the law as stated as it pertains 
to wills but such is not the law as to reformation of deeds. 
Page does state that it has been said, a court of equity 
has no jurisdiction to reform a will but says it has been 
said that refonnation would be granted if the will had 
been executed in accordance with a contract to make a 
will. 
For the reasons heretofore stated, point 4 has no 
place in the argument. Neither has point 5 regarding 
equities. There is nothing in the record supporting the 
argmnent of respondents as to equities. \Vho knows 
what the evidence will show~ \Vho knows but 'vhat 
appellant might have contributed much toward the pres-
ervation of the property, in the payment of taxes and 
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upkeep, etc. Neither is there any evidence a.s to values 
of properties before the court. 
In the Carson vs. Palmer (Fla. 1939), 190 So. 720 
case relied upon by respondents it appears the deed 
involved contained two inconsistent descriptions, either 
of \Vhich would identify a different parcel of property 
from that described by the other. ·The facts are not at 
all like. the instant case. 
Respondents argue that Mr. Bush, a civil engineer, 
if called by appellant would have no authority to say 
which should be deleted or what should be added to 
make a valid description.· Appellant does not contend 
Mr. Bush 'vould have such authority. From the affidavit 
contained in the record, Mr. Bush would testify that 
he could locate the property by the description contained 
therein by applying the rules of survey. This is all that 
is necessary to be shown according to the authorities 
cited by appellant in her original brief. 
Respondents state the west call, N. 46° 25' W. runs 
through the middle of the tract included in the deed. 
This is not so, that line is located toward the westerly 
line and cuts off the small tract protruding, shown at 
the lower left hand corner of the plat attached to appel-
lant's original brief. 
As to the original deed by which Mr. Hovlard ac-
quired title to the tract and appellant's referring to 
same, appellant has a right to refer to that deed, it helps 
to show the intent of the grantor in the deed here in 
question in following the identical calls with those con-
tained in the deed by which Howard took title to the 
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tract. The rule of law is that the whole of the document 
(the deed here in question) is to be taken together so 
as to give effect to every part, each clause helping to 
interpret the others. 
The law announced in 68 ALR page 12 relied upon 
by respondents referring to patent defects is not in 
point. It is evident from those authorities that which is 
considered as patent defects is for example where the 
description states, ''home lot" in a given lot, block and 
"\\.,.ard, or "27 acres in fractional 15, in Vandenburgh 
County, Indiana." The law given in such cases is to the 
effect that there must be such an uncertainty appearing 
on the face of the deed that the court, reading the lan-
guage in the light of all the facts and circumstances 
referred to in the instru.ment, is unable to derive there-
from the intention of the grantor as to what land was 
to be conveyed. We contend that from the facts and cir-
cumstances and from a reading of the description given 
in the Howard deed, the intention of the grantor is clearly 
shown. (Italics added). 
Respondents argue the Losee. case does not help 
appellant because there was in that case a positive de-
livery of the deed. So too was the Howard deed delivered. 
How can respondents contend there was no delivery in 
this case~ The court in granting this judgment must 
assume there was a positive and unconditional delivery 
of the deed. 
At page 25, respondents say, "It is obvious that 
where there is on the face of the deed, such information 
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that the missing courses and distances fairly suggest 
themselves the deed may be upheld." This is appellant's 
contention, such admission on the part of respondent 
is decisive of the case. 
Under point 9 respondents argue the reference to 
acreage is of no assistance to appellant because the acre~ 
age in the tract is in excess of 2. 75 acres, as stated by 
the grantor in the deed, 2.75 acres more or less. The 
reference to acreage is important. It shows the grantor 
by his deed was not intending to convey .a small parcel 
out of a large tract but he 'vas conveying a large tract 
out of which he: excepted small tracts theretofore con-
veyed by him. It is evident the grantor intended to con-
vey all that was left out of the original tract. 
Respondents ask, "What did the grantor intend to 
retain~" The answer is he did not intend to retain any 
part of the tract which was left after having conveyed 
the Temple and Wood and theatre tracts and omitting 
the small piece at the lower left hand corner which pro-
trudes westerly from the large tract. 
The conclusion set out in respondents' brief states 
among other things, from the admissions of appellant, 
if the defective deed is reformed, almost the whole of 
decedent's estate \viii go to the widow and the children 
of the first marriage will be virtually disinherited. \Ve 
submit there is nothing in the pleadings or admissions 
as a basis for such statement. Neither is there anything 
in the record of this case which shows injustice or 
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inequity if the deed is reformed, this question could only 
he before the court, if evidence 'vere taken. 
CONCLUSION 
The deed is so evident of the intention of the grantor 
the same should be reformed and judgment should be 
so entered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
M. v. BACKMAN OF 
BACKl\fAN, BACKMAN & CLARK, 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant. 
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